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What’s in a Form? Employment Background Checks
Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act
EMILY SCACE
For employers, background checks, credit checks, and similar measures are a
prudent step to guard against negligent hiring claims and other potential losses that
can result from poor hiring decisions. But these practices necessarily require
employees to relinquish some of their interests in privacy and may also introduce
bias into the hiring process. The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), which applies
to many of these employment screening measures, requires employers to follow
certain procedural requirements that seek to ensure that employees and applicants
understand the scope of the information that will be sought in a background or
credit check, provide informed consent to the disclosure, and have an opportunity
to explain or correct the information before an employer takes adverse action.
While alleged FCRA disclosure and notification deficiencies are a frequent
source of litigation between employers and employees, courts have been
inconsistent in their approach to evaluating when these procedural issues cross the
line into concrete harms. A recent Supreme Court decision, TransUnion LLC v.
Ramirez, may further narrow applicants’ and employees’ ability to obtain relief for
employers’ FCRA missteps.
This Note argues that although the FCRA’s procedural mechanisms leave much
to be desired, they serve an important purpose both in protecting individuals’ interests
in safeguarding their personal information and in lending predictability to employers’
hiring practices. Courts, therefore, should avoid taking an overly restrictive approach
in evaluating the harms alleged by plaintiffs when making standing decisions that turn
on statutory violations of the FCRA. In addition, the FCRA should be strengthened in
several key respects to close the gaps left by the statute’s procedural rights and bring
consistency to the employment screening landscape.
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What’s in a Form? Employment Background Checks
Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act
EMILY SCACE *
INTRODUCTION
Employers seeking information about prospective and current employees
use a variety of methods to learn about their backgrounds, from professional
reference checks to criminal background checks to credit checks and beyond.1
When an employer uses a third-party consumer reporting agency (CRA) to
carry out these investigations, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)2 imposes
certain disclosure, authorization, certification, and notification requirements.3
In a nutshell, these requirements seek to ensure that employees and applicants
understand the scope of the information that will be sought, provide informed
consent to the disclosure, and have an opportunity to explain or correct the
information before an employer takes adverse action, such as denying or
withdrawing a job offer.4
For employers, background checks, credit checks, and similar measures
are a prudent step to guard against negligent hiring claims and other potential
losses that can result from poor hiring decisions.5 But these practices
necessarily require employees to relinquish some of their interests in privacy
and may also introduce bias into the hiring process that exacerbates existing
disparities.6 Employees, for the most part, do not have a choice about this
trade-off if they wish to be employed. Therefore, transparency into the process
and safeguards to ensure its fairness and accuracy are crucial for balancing the
interests of employers against those of applicants and employees.

*

J.D. Candidate, University of Connecticut School of Law, May 2023.
HR.COM, HOW HUMAN RESOURCES PROFESSIONALS VIEW AND USE BACKGROUND SCREENING
IN EMPLOYMENT 7–11 (2019). The report was based on a survey of 2,301 human resources professionals.
Id. at 11.
2
15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x.
3
Id. § 1681b(b)(2)(A), (3)(A).
4
Id.
5
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NO. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE
CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT pt. III.B (2012) [hereinafter EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE]; Margaret M.
Clark, How to Address Negligent Hiring Concerns, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RES. MGMT. (Feb. 27, 2019),
https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/spring2019/pages/how-to-address-negligent-hiringconcerns.aspx.
6
EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 5, at pt. I.
1
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According to the Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM),
the number of lawsuits brought under the FCRA has more than doubled
since 2009 and continues to increase.7 Claims against employers primarily
allege violations of disclosure requirements before a background check is
run or failure to provide required notice before taking adverse action.8
Many lawsuits against employers under the FCRA turn on the question
of whether deficiencies in disclosure requirements caused actual harm to the
plaintiff or were “bare procedural violation[s]” as characterized in Spokeo,
Inc. v. Robins.9 At the initial stage, the FCRA requires a clear and
conspicuous written disclosure to be provided to the employee before an
employer may obtain that employee’s consumer report.10 This document
must consist solely of the required disclosure, with no extra information.11
A 2017 case, Syed v. M-I, LLC,12 turned on the question of whether a plaintiff
suffered concrete harm from an employer’s inclusion of a liability waiver in
the same document as the required disclosure.13 The Ninth Circuit held that
the employer had committed a willful violation of the FCRA by including
the liability waiver, in violation of the “clear statutory language that the
disclosure document must consist ‘solely’ of the disclosure.”14
After the Syed decision, the question of when disclosure deficiencies
cross the line from procedural violations into concrete harm continues to be
litigated in both state and federal courts, with inconsistent results. According
to a recent article, the growth in FCRA litigation may be at least partially
because “filing these claims has become formulaic and low-cost,
high-volume, and profitable” for law firms.15 But is this trend really driven
primarily by law firms’ profit-seeking motives? And are the harms alleged
by plaintiffs proportionate to the damages and settlements paid out by
defendants in the successful cases? More broadly, is the litigation
surrounding alleged FCRA violations providing a remedy that advances the
aims of the statute in protecting employees’ interests?
This Note argues that although the FCRA’s procedural mechanisms
leave much to be desired, they serve an important purpose both in protecting
individuals’ interests in safeguarding their personal information and in
lending predictability to employers’ hiring practices. Courts, therefore,
7

Roy Maurer, FCRA Litigation on Track to Reach a New High, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RES. MGMT. (Dec.
3, 2019), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/talent-acquisition/pages/fcra-litigation-trackreach-new-high.aspx.
8
Id.
9
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
10
15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i).
11
Id.
12
853 F.3d 492 (9th Cir. 2017).
13
Id. at 495–96, 499.
14
Id. at 496.
15
Robert Quackenboss, Matthew Bobb & Alyson Brown, Employer Compliance Reminders as FCRA
Class Actions Rise, LAW360 (Oct. 23, 2020, 11:11 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1320405/employercompliance-reminders-as-fcra-class-actions-rise-.
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should avoid taking an overly restrictive approach in evaluating the harms
alleged by plaintiffs when making standing decisions that turn on statutory
violations of the FCRA. In addition, the FCRA should be strengthened in
several key respects to close the gaps left by the statute’s procedural rights
and counteract the trend of state and local laws that subject employers to
unpredictable and inconsistent obligations depending on where their
employees are located.
I. BACKGROUND CHECKS AND THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT
As its name implies, the FCRA is primarily concerned with ensuring the
accuracy and transparency of the type of consumer credit information
frequently used to approve and deny loans, insurance, and other financial
products.16 The Congressional findings and statement of purpose make only a
single passing reference to the statute’s employment ramifications.17 Yet when
an employer conducts a background check on a prospective or current
employee, that process comes under the FCRA’s umbrella if it entails
obtaining a consumer report from a consumer reporting agency.18 As defined
in the statute, a consumer report is not just a traditional credit report, but rather:
[A]ny written, oral, or other communication of any information
by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit
worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general
reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is
used or expected to be used or collected . . . for the purpose of
serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for
. . . credit or insurance . . . ; employment purposes; or any other
purpose authorized under section 1681b of this title.19
A consumer reporting agency under the FCRA is an entity that “regularly
engages . . . in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit
information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing
consumer reports to third parties.”20
These broad definitions mean that almost all background checks
conducted for employment purposes—meaning those “used for the purpose
of evaluating a consumer for employment, promotion, reassignment or
retention as an employee”21—are covered under the FCRA. Although the
statute does not apply when an employer performs an investigation itself
16

15 U.S.C. § 1681(b).
“It is the purpose of this subchapter to require that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable
procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other
information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).
18
Id. § 1681b(a)(3)(B).
19
Id. § 1681a(d)(1).
20
Id. § 1681a(f).
21
Id. § 1681a(h).
17
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rather than using the services of a CRA, many types of information about an
individual are not practically obtainable by any other means. Moreover, even
for information an employer could feasibly investigate on its own, such as
work and educational history, the time and effort involved in doing so,
particularly for large organizations, mean that it is often more efficient for
an employer to outsource the entire process to a CRA.
Certain procedural requirements apply to the background check process.
First, before obtaining a consumer report for employment purposes, the
individual whose report will be obtained must be given a “clear and
conspicuous disclosure . . . in writing” and must “authorize[] in writing . . .
the procurement of the report.”22 The disclosure must be a standalone
document containing only the disclosure, with no extraneous information.23
Next, if an employer intends to take adverse action based on the findings in
a consumer report, it must provide the affected individual with a copy of the
report and a written description of the person’s rights under the FCRA.24
Those rights include the right to obtain a copy of one’s own consumer report
and the right to dispute information contained in a report.25 In the
employment context, adverse action includes “a denial of employment or
any other decision for employment purposes that adversely affects any
current or prospective employee.”26
These procedural steps may seem to be mere pro forma requirements,
but they are a major source of litigation.27 Given the prevalence of
employment-related background checks, this is perhaps not surprising.
According to a 2019 report, ninety-six percent of employers conduct one or
more types of background screening, with eighty-six percent of respondents
indicating that they screen all full-time employees and sixty-seven percent
screening all part-time employees.28 Criminal background checks are the
most widely used, but many employers also obtain credit information, verify
education or prior employment, check professional license status, or
evaluate motor vehicle driving records, among other categories of

22

Id. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i)–(ii).
Id. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i).
24
Id. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i)–(ii).
25
Id. § 1681g(c)(1)(B)(i), (iii).
26
Id. § 1681a(k)(1)(B)(ii).
27
See, e.g., Syed v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492, 495–96 (9th Cir. 2017) (considering whether inclusion
of extra information on a disclosure form caused harm to the plaintiff); Robertson v. Allied Sols., LLC,
902 F.3d 690, 699 (7th Cir. 2018) (finding a concrete injury conferring standing based on an employer’s
failure to provide required information before taking adverse action); Walker v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 953
F.3d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 2020) (analyzing whether a disclosure may contain an explanation of
terminology and considering whether the FCRA provides a right to discuss consumer reports directly
with an employer); Grice v. Pepsi Beverages Co., 363 F. Supp. 3d 401, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (evaluating
a class action settlement stemming from alleged violations of FCRA standalone disclosure requirements).
28
HR.COM, supra note 1, at 3.
23
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29

information. Fifty-nine percent of employers conduct these background
checks only during the hiring process, while twelve percent of employers
use background checks at other times because of a legal requirement and
eleven percent do so for cause.30
The FCRA is not the only law that imposes limitations on employers’
use of background check information. At the federal level, Title VII
employment discrimination concerns may be implicated if an employer’s
use of background check information disproportionately harms members of
a protected class.31 In addition, a number of states and municipalities have
adopted “ban the box” laws, which limit employers’ ability to obtain and
consider criminal history in the hiring process, along with laws that restrict
the use of credit checks in employment decisions.32 Some jurisdictions have
adopted counterparts to the FCRA that provide additional protections for
applicants and employees or place stricter limits on the types of information
a consumer report obtained for employment purposes may contain.33
II. SYED AND ITS AFTERMATH
When Syed was decided in 2017, it presented an issue of first impression
in the Ninth Circuit: whether the inclusion of extra information—specifically,
a liability waiver—on the required disclosure and authorization document
violated the FCRA.34 The defendant in Syed provided the necessary disclosure
and authorization to the plaintiff before obtaining his consumer report, and
the disclosures were “clear and conspicuous” as the statute mandates.35
However, the page containing those mandatory elements also included the
following provision:

29

Id. at 7–11.
Id. at 5.
31
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N & FED. TRADE COMM’N, EEOC-NVTA-0000-38,
BACKGROUND CHECKS: WHAT EMPLOYERS NEED TO KNOW (2014).
32
BETH AVERY & HAN LU, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, BAN THE BOX: U.S. CITIES, COUNTIES, AND
STATES ADOPT FAIR-CHANCE POLICIES TO ADVANCE EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEOPLE WITH
PAST CONVICTIONS 2–3 (2020). For specific examples of state laws that limit pre-employment credit
checks, see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51tt(b) (2021) (prohibiting employers from requiring
employees and applicants to consent to requests for credit reports with limited exceptions); MD. CODE
ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-711(b)(c) (2021) (prohibiting the use of credit reports or credit history to deny
employment to an applicant, to discharge an employee, or to determine an employee’s compensation or
other employment terms and conditions with limited exceptions); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.020(2)(c)(i)
(2021) (limiting the use of credit reports for employment purposes to situations in which the information is
either required by law or “[s]ubstantially job related” and requiring employers to disclose their reasons for
using such information to the affected individual).
33
Examples include the Colorado Consumer Credit Reporting Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-18-101 to
-118 (2021), and the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1785.1–.36
(Deering 2021).
34
Syed v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492, 495–96 (9th Cir. 2017).
35
15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i).
30
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I hereby discharge, release and indemnify prospective
employer, PreCheck, Inc., their agents, servants and
employees, and all parties that rely on this release and/or the
information obtained with this release from any and all
liability and claims arising by reason of the use of this release
and dissemination of information that is false and untrue if
obtained from a third party without verification.36
According to the court, that single sentence was sufficient to establish a
willful violation of the FCRA.37 By presenting the liability waiver alongside
the disclosure and authorization document, the court reasoned, the defendant
frustrated the statute’s purpose of “guarding a job applicant’s right to control
the dissemination of sensitive personal information.”38 A disclosure and
authorization document “focuses the applicant’s attention on the nature of the
personal information the prospective employer may obtain, and the
employer’s inability to obtain that information without his consent,” explained
the court, while “a liability waiver does just the opposite—it pulls the
applicant’s attention away from his privacy rights protected by the FCRA by
calling his attention to the rights he must forego if he signs the document.”39
In finding that the defendant violated the FCRA by including the
liability waiver with the disclosure and authorization, the Syed court
examined the underlying purpose of the statutory requirements and
considered how the addition of a liability waiver, specifically, acted contrary
to that purpose. In other words, the court implied that it was significant that
the clause at issue was a liability waiver, which is not just extraneous
information with the potential to distract or confuse but arguably an
inclusion that directly undermines the goal of obtaining an applicant’s
informed consent.
In other parts of its analysis, however, Syed relies on a more rigid
application of the statute’s plain language, focusing on the FCRA’s
requirement that the disclosure document “consist[] solely of the
disclosure.”40 The specific exception allowing the authorization to appear on
the same document as the disclosure,41 according to the court, further
demonstrates Congress’s intent that the disclosure be free from extraneous

36

Syed, 853 F.3d at 508.
Id. at 506.
38
Id. at 501–02.
39
Id. at 502.
40
15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
41
Id. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii) (“Except as provided in subparagraph (B), a person may not procure a
consumer report, or cause a consumer report to be procured, for employment purposes with respect to
any consumer, unless . . . the consumer has authorized in writing (which authorization may be made on
the document referred to in clause (i)) the procurement of the report by that person.”).
37
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42

information. The use of the word “solely” in the disclosure requirement
rendered the defendant’s interpretation of the statute “objectively
unreasonable,”43 and the court found that “M-I acted in ‘reckless disregard
of statutory duty,’” leading to a willful violation of the FCRA.44 Under this
line of reasoning, the content of the extraneous information is irrelevant; the
statute “says what it means and means what it says,”45 and a disclosure
document that does not “consist[] solely of the disclosure”46 is a willful
violation of its requirements.
So does the content of extraneous information on a disclosure document
matter or not? Syed does not provide a definitive answer, at times signaling
that the relationship between the substance of the extra information and the
FCRA’s underlying purpose affects the severity of the violation and at other
times suggesting that the inclusion of any information beyond the mandatory
disclosure and authorization is equally problematic. The Ninth Circuit
returned to this question in Gilberg v. California Check Cashing Stores,
LLC, a 2019 case that examined whether an employer’s inclusion of
disclosure statements required by various states along with the required
FCRA disclosure violated the standalone document requirement.47
Affirming its holding in Syed, the court held that the state disclosures were
“extraneous information . . . as likely to confuse as [they are] to inform” and
found a violation of the FCRA.48 The Gilberg court reemphasized that
Syed’s holding was grounded primarily in the FCRA’s plain language, rather
than the specific nature of a liability waiver as opposed to some other piece
of extraneous information.49 Rejecting the defendant’s argument that its
disclosure form should be treated differently from that in Syed “because it
helps applicants understand their state and federal rights,” the court stated
that “purpose does not override plain meaning.”50
In 2020, the Ninth Circuit elaborated further on this line of reasoning.
In Walker v. Fred Meyer, Inc., a job applicant at a grocery store alleged that
the defendant had willfully violated the FCRA by “providing an unclear

42
Syed, 853 F.3d at 500 (“The two clauses are consistent because the authorization clause is an
express exception to the requirement that the document consist ‘solely of the disclosure.’”).
43
Id. at 504.
44
Id. at 506 (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57 (2007)).
45
Id. at 507 (citing Simmons v. Himmelreich, 136 S. Ct. 1843, 1848 (2016)).
46
15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i).
47
Gilberg v. Cal. Check Cashing Stores, LLC, 913 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 2019). The disclosure
form contained seven separate disclosure statements directed at residents of California, New York,
Maine, Oregon, Washington, Minnesota, and Oklahoma. Id. at 1172–73. The statements detailed the
rights of applicants and employees under various state laws to receive copies of their background check
information, among other provisions. Id.
48
Id. at 1176.
49
Id. at 1175.
50
Id.
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disclosure form encumbered by extraneous information.” The information
included in the Walker disclosure was more extensive than Syed’s
single-sentence liability waiver, consisting of “several disclosure and
acknowledgement forms, including two documents concerning an
investigation of his background.”52 The plaintiff consented to the disclosure
but later alleged that the documents were confusing and that he was “unable
meaningfully to evaluate and understand the nature of the report that Fred
Meyer intended to obtain about him.”53
The court’s decision in Walker reiterated its stance in Syed and Gilberg,
emphasizing that the FCRA requires “that a disclosure form contain nothing
more than the disclosure itself.”54 But having established that, the court
turned to the question of “what language counts as part of the ‘disclosure’
itself” and held that a disclosure may include some “concise explanation,”
such as a definition of the term “consumer report,” a description of how such
a report will be obtained, and an explanation of the employment purposes
for which it may be used.55 Allowing this additional context, the court found,
“would further the purpose of the disclosure by helping the consumer
understand the disclosure.”56 Applying this standard, the court then found
that of the five paragraphs that made up the disclosure document at issue,
51
52

Walker v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 953 F.3d 1082, 1084, 1086 (9th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 1084. The language of the disclosure read as follows:
We ([t]he Kroger family of companies) will obtain one or more consumer reports or
investigative consumer reports (or both) about you for employment purposes. These
purposes may include hiring, contract, assignment, promotion, reassignment, and
termination. The reports will include information about your character, general
reputation, personal characteristics, and mode of living.
We will obtain these reports through a consumer reporting agency. The consumer
reporting agency is General Information Services, Inc. GIS’s address is P.O. Box 353,
Chapin, SC 29036. GIS’s telephone number is (866) 265-4917. GIS’s website is at
www.geninfo.com.
To prepare the reports, GIS may investigate your education, work history,
professional licenses and credentials, references, address history, social security
number validity, right to work, criminal record, lawsuits, driving record and any other
information with public or private information sources.
You may inspect GIS’s files about you (in person, by mail, or by phone) by providing
identification to GIS. If you do, GIS will provide you help to understand the files,
including communication with trained personnel and an explanation of any codes.
Another person may accompany you by providing identification.
If GIS obtains any information by interview, you have the right to obtain a complete
and accurate disclosure of the scope and nature of the investigation performed.

Id. at 1084–85.
53
Id. at 1085.
54
Id. at 1087.
55
Id. at 1088–89.
56
Id. at 1089.
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the first three paragraphs were acceptable, but the final two paragraphs,
which detailed applicants’ rights to inspect the consumer reporting agency’s
files about them, exceeded the scope of a permissible FCRA disclosure and
violated the standalone disclosure requirement.57 Again applying the logic
of Syed, the Walker court found that the inclusion of this language had the
potential to distract an applicant by “‘pull[ing] the applicant’s attention away
from his privacy rights protected by the FCRA by calling his attention to the
rights’ that he has to inspect GIS’s files.”58
Unlike the liability waiver in Syed, and like the state disclosures at issue
in Gilberg, the extraneous information in Walker was not directly contrary to
the purpose of the FCRA’s disclosure requirements; indeed, the court found it
likely that the language was “included in good faith in order to provide
additional useful information about an applicant’s rights.”59 Nevertheless, the
court found the risk of distraction and confusion to be too high, and the
information contained in the two paragraphs at issue to be too remote from the
FCRA’s required disclosures, to allow it to fall under the umbrella of
permissible “concise explanation.”60 Unlike in Syed, however, the court in
Walker did not find the defendant’s violation to be willful.61 A straightforward
application of Syed’s logic—its emphasis on the FCRA’s language and the
importance of the term “solely”—would seem to suggest that the defendant’s
actions in Walker ran equally afoul of its statutory duty by including
extraneous information in its disclosure documents. But the Walker court
declined to take that approach. Although the decision in Walker does not state
as much, the court seems less inclined to take a punitive approach against a
defendant it views as acting in good faith, even if its efforts technically
violated the FCRA’s standalone disclosure requirement.
III. SPOKEO AND INTANGIBLE INJURIES
Underlying the analysis in Syed, Gilberg, and Walker is an attempt to
connect the statutory violation committed by an employer that uses a
noncompliant form with an actual harm suffered by the plaintiff. Without
this connection, a deficient form is likely to fit the definition, established in
Spokeo v. Robins, of a “bare procedural violation” that is insufficient to
confer Article III standing in federal court.62 Spokeo also concerned the
FCRA, but outside of the employment context. The plaintiff in Spokeo
alleged that the defendant, a people search engine, had disseminated
inaccurate information about his marital status, age, employment status,
57

Id. at 1090–91.
Id. at 1090 (quoting Syed v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492, 502 (9th Cir. 2017)).
59
Id.
60
Id. at 1088–91.
61
Id. at 1090.
62
Spokeo, Inc., v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
58
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income, and education level, in violation of the FCRA’s requirement that
consumer reporting agencies “follow reasonable procedures to assure
maximum possible accuracy.”63 Writing for the 6-2 majority,64 Justice Alito
explained that although Congress “has the power to define injuries and
articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy
where none existed before,”65 that power is not absolute. “Congress’s role in
identifying and elevating intangible harms does not mean that a plaintiff
automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute
grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue
to vindicate that right,” and a concrete injury is necessary “even in the
context of a statutory violation.”66 The decision noted that “[a] violation of
one of the FCRA’s procedural requirements may result in no harm,”
specifically pointing to a failure to provide a required notice as an example
of a technical violation that would likely be insufficient, by itself, to
establish standing.67
But despite the more demanding test for statutory injuries articulated in
Spokeo, the Court did not hold that the plaintiff necessarily lacked standing as a
matter of law. Instead, the majority found that the Ninth Circuit had engaged in
an incomplete analysis of “the distinction between concreteness and
particularization” and had failed to address the question of “whether the
particular procedural violations alleged in this case entail[ed] a degree of risk
sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement.”68 Notably, the Court “[took]
no position as to whether the Ninth Circuit’s ultimate conclusion—that Robins
adequately alleged an injury in fact—was correct.”69 Indeed, on remand, the
Ninth Circuit, analyzing the concreteness of the plaintiff’s alleged injuries as the
Supreme Court directed, found that the plaintiff had met his burden to establish
standing; the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari to that decision.70

63

Id. at 1544–46; 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).
Spokeo was decided in May 2016, approximately three months after the death of Justice Antonin
Scalia and prior to the appointment of Justice Neil Gorsuch. Justices 1789 to Present, SUP. CT. OF THE
U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2021). Thus, when
the decision was issued, the Court consisted of only eight Justices. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1544; Justices
1789 to Present, supra.
65
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
66
Id.
67
Id. at 1550.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1118 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 931 (2018)
(“We are satisfied that Robins has alleged injuries that are sufficiently concrete for the purposes of Article
III. . . . [W]e previously determined that the alleged injuries were also sufficiently particularized to Robins
and that they were caused by Spokeo’s alleged FCRA violations and are redressable in court. . . . The
Supreme Court did not question those prior conclusions, and we do not revisit them now. Robins has
therefore adequately alleged the elements necessary for standing.”).
64
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In assessing whether the plaintiff had proven a concrete injury, the Ninth
Circuit analyzed the ways in which intangible injuries can constitute an injury
in fact.71 Central to this inquiry are two questions: “whether the statutory
provisions at issue were established to protect [the plaintiff’s] concrete
interests (as opposed to purely procedural rights), and if so, . . . whether the
specific procedural violations alleged in this case actually harm, or present a
material risk of harm to, such interests.”72 In justifying its decision, the court
“ha[d] little difficulty concluding that [the] interests protected by FCRA’s
procedural requirements are ‘real,’ rather than purely legal creations.”73
Pointing to the importance of the information contained in consumer reports
in a variety of contexts, including employment, the court emphasized that “the
very existence of inaccurate information” in a credit report can pose a risk to
a person’s livelihood and “conclude[s] that the FCRA procedures at issue in
this case were crafted to protect consumers’ (like Robins’s) concrete interest
in accurate credit reporting about themselves.”74
Not “every minor inaccuracy” will result in harm, the court noted,
opining that “the [Supreme] Court gave little guidance as to what varieties
of misinformation should fall into the harmless category.”75 Nevertheless,
the Ninth Circuit found that Robins had clearly established the type of
concrete harm the FCRA sought to prevent. “It does not take much
imagination to understand how inaccurate reports on such a broad range of
material facts about Robins’s life could be deemed a real harm,” the court
explained.76 “For example, Robins alleged that he is out of work . . . but that
Spokeo’s inaccurate reports have ‘caused actual harm to [his] employment
prospects’ by misrepresenting facts that would be relevant to employers, and
that he suffers from ‘anxiety . . . about his diminished employment
prospects.’”77 Those facts on their own were sufficient to grant Article III
standing without the need to prove “additional concrete harm as well (such
as the loss of a specific job opportunity).”78
The Spokeo decision has led to a significant amount of confusion
surrounding the issue of concrete and particularized harms for intangible
injuries.79 Professor Jon Romberg has argued that the court’s two examples
71

Id. at 1112–13.
Id. at 1113.
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Id. at 1114.
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Id. at 1114–15.
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Id. at 1116–17.
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Id. at 1117.
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See Jon Romberg, Trust the Process: Understanding Procedural Standing Under Spokeo, 72
OKLA. L. REV. 517, 520 (2020) (discussing confusion regarding procedural standing following the
Spokeo decision and proposing a framework to clarify the issue); Jackson Erpenbach, Note, A
Post-Spokeo Taxonomy of Intangible Harms, 118 MICH. L. REV. 471, 473 (2019) (arguing that Spokeo
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of procedural violations unlikely to result in harm—an incorrect zip code
and a defective notice process when a credit report contains no
inaccuracies—are “mistaken on their own terms” and lend themselves to
misinterpretation with the potential to “sharply curtail the possibility of
judicial redress for claimants under process-heavy statutes, including
consumers.”80 The FCRA, of course, is precisely the type of process-heavy
statute that falls under this umbrella.
Romberg further contends that there are distinct categories of procedural
rights created by Congress, with each category implicating a particular set
of standing principles depending on Congress’s intent.81 Spokeo, Romberg
argues, concerns “instrumental rights against private parties,” which are
“intended to protect some distinct interest other than the denial of the right
itself.”82 In the case of the FCRA, the “distinct interests” implicated would
presumably include an individual’s interests in controlling the dissemination
of personal information (a privacy interest), ensuring the accuracy of that
information (a reputational interest), and consenting to its uses for specific
purposes when engaged in activities such as applying for credit or seeking
employment. The various procedural mechanisms in the statute, including
the notice and disclosure requirements that employers must follow when
conducting background checks, are not ends in themselves, but are—at least
theoretically—all in service of those core interests. As Romberg points out,
Congress may choose a procedural mechanism to protect a given interest
rather than protecting the interest directly because it may be difficult to
prove certain injuries or because “it believes the instrumental right is a
necessary and proper means of prophylactically preventing members of a
group from suffering the target injury, rather than simply affording
compensation for the subset of group members who file suit and are able to
prove the target injury has occurred.”83
But is this assumption correct? Can a procedural mechanism like those
in the FCRA effectively substitute for more direct protection of a target
interest? A number of commentators have argued that, at least in the specific
context of the FCRA, procedure does not adequately accomplish this goal.84
Noam Weiss, for example, argued in 2012 that because “the FCRA is not a
strict liability statute,” violations are difficult to prove, and “while private
80

Romberg, supra note 79, at 546.
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Id. at 570–71 (emphasis omitted).
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Id. at 573.
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See Noam Weiss, Note, Combating Inaccuracies in Criminal Background Checks by Giving
Meaning to the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 271, 274–75 (2012) (detailing courts’
struggles to meaningfully enforce the FCRA and impose liability for violations). See also Alexandra P.
Everhart Sickler, The (Un)Fair Credit Reporting Act, 28 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 238, 241–42 (2016)
(arguing that the FCRA’s procedural enforcement mechanisms are flawed and should be redesigned to
accomplish its goal of ensuring accurate consumer reports).
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litigation may have been intended as a way to enforce the FCRA’s goal of
ensuring accuracy in the reporting industry, the reality of engaging in
protracted litigation often presents an insurmountable hurdle for consumers
seeking relief, and even then, only after they have been injured.”85 As a
remedy, Weiss proposed amending the FCRA to require that credit reports
be provided to an individual before they are disseminated to an employer.86
But while this step could decrease the risk of harm resulting from the
dissemination of a report containing inaccuracies, it, too, is a procedural
mechanism that presumably would not escape Spokeo’s requirements for a
concrete and particularized injury.87 It is not difficult to imagine courts
struggling to determine whether the dissemination of a credit report to a
prospective employer without first providing the report to the applicant
resulted in concrete harm to a plaintiff. And because employers, when
making employment decisions, must typically narrow a large pool of
applicants to hire only a small number of individuals, it is exceedingly
difficult to establish that any single factor—such as an erroneous
background report—was dispositive in an employer’s decision not to hire a
particular applicant. Thus, it would be an exceptional case in which a
plaintiff would be able to prove a causal connection between a violation of
this proposed requirement and a concrete, particularized injury to the
interests protected under the FCRA.
Returning to the issue of disclosure, Syed, Gilberg, and Walker all
emphasize the importance of informed consent to the FCRA’s protections.88
But does a job applicant presented with a background check disclosure and
authorization really have the agency the Syed court suggests “to control the
dissemination of sensitive personal information”?89 The decisions do not
directly address his question, seeming to take for granted that the FCRA’s
disclosure and authorization procedure, when followed correctly,
accomplishes this purpose. But while it may be literally true that an employer
must obtain consent from an employee before obtaining a consumer report, in
most cases, an employee who withholds this consent is effectively deciding to
forego that particular employment opportunity. Indeed, the plaintiff in Walker
seemed to be aware of this dilemma; as the decision states, he gave his consent
to the disclosures “in order to proceed with this employment opportunity,”
despite his claimed lack of understanding of precisely what he was consenting
to.90 Nor does the statute itself address this issue. The FCRA requires an
85

Weiss, supra note 84, at 274–75.
Id. at 276.
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Weiss, of course, was writing four years before Spokeo was decided. Id. at 271; Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1540 (2016).
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Syed v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492, 501 (9th Cir. 2017); Gilberg v. Cal. Check Cashing Stores, LLC,
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employer to provide a copy of an individual’s consumer report and a written
description of the person’s rights under the FCRA if it intends to take adverse
action based on the results of its investigation, but the Act is silent on the
question of how an employer may treat an applicant who refuses to consent to
the investigation in the first place.91
State and local laws sometimes attempt to provide more direct protection
to applicants’ and employees’ FCRA-linked interests. For example, a
growing number of jurisdictions have enacted criminal background
screening laws that go beyond “ban the box” (i.e., prohibiting employers
from asking applicants to disclose criminal history at the application phase)
and require employers that wish to conduct criminal background checks to
wait to do so until after they have extended a conditional job offer to an
individual.92 Some of these statutes also require that an employer that intends
to withdraw an offer based on the findings in a background check justify its
decision using specified factors to establish a legitimate business reason that
an applicant’s criminal or credit history is a valid reason for declining to hire
an individual.93 These state and local laws take an important step toward
safeguarding the rights the FCRA purports to protect, but, of course, they
cannot confer standing in federal court unless there is an independent basis
for subject matter jurisdiction, such as diversity.94
The proliferation of state and local laws affecting background screening
also poses complications for multistate employers. And with the rapid
growth of remote work, many more employers may find themselves in this
category, as many of these laws base applicability on where the employee
performs work rather than where the employer’s physical facilities are
located. Indeed, the disclosure form at issue in Gilberg effectively illustrates
the compliance maze many employers must navigate, with its provisions for
applicants or employees based in New York, Maine, Oregon, Washington,
California, Minnesota, and Oklahoma.95 While the employer attempted to
cover its bases by including all the pertinent state-required information on
the form, the Court found that in doing so, it had both contravened the
FCRA’s standalone disclosure requirement and undermined the clarity
91

15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A).
See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.5(b) (2021) (allowing employers to take criminal convictions
into account when making employment decisions only after the extension of a conditional employment
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See, e.g., N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 752–53 (Consol. 2021) (requiring an employer to consider
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See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (limiting federal courts’ jurisdiction to cases arising under,
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95
Gilberg v. Cal. Check Cashing Stores, LLC, 913 F.3d 1169, 1172–73 (9th Cir. 2019).
92

WHAT’S IN A FORM?

2022]

567

96

requirement. In theory, the employer could have separated these
disclosures, but it is difficult to see how that step would make a material
difference to an employee’s ability to effectively parse and understand the
information they contained—which is, of course, the underlying goal of the
FCRA’s disclosure provisions.
But beyond these logistical complications, state and local attempts to
provide greater protections surrounding the use of employees’ personal
information are insufficient to support the needs of an increasingly national
job market and economy. Individuals residing in jurisdictions that have not
adopted these measures are no less deserving of heightened protections.
Moreover, the current path of increasingly divergent rights under state and
local laws may even create disparities between employees working for or
applying to the same employer. If an employer hiring for a remote role may
obtain background information on an employee based in Idaho or Florida
more readily and with fewer restrictions than it may obtain the same
information about an employee based in New York or Illinois, the potential
exists for two types of disparities. First, applicants in states with fewer
protections may be subject to more invasive examinations of their
background information, with all the racial and gender disparities those
practices can reinforce. 97 Second, an employer may preferentially choose to
hire employees from the more lightly regulated jurisdictions, creating a
different type of disparity—though not one explicitly prohibited under
federal antidiscrimination laws. A uniform national approach is needed to
avoid these outcomes and provide a consistent, predictable standard for
employers to apply.
IV.THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF TRANSUNION
A recently decided Supreme Court case, TransUnion, LLC, v. Ramirez,
returned to some of the issues raised in Spokeo.98 At issue in the case was
credit reporting bureau TransUnion’s practice of placing erroneous terrorist
alerts (“OFAC alerts”) on the consumer reports of thousands of individuals
based on a name-only search without verification by an additional data point,
such as date of birth or Social Security Number.99 In addition, the plaintiffs
alleged that formatting defects in mailings from TransUnion amounted to a
96
Id. at 1176–77 (“[T]he disclosure would confuse a reasonable reader because it combines federal
and state disclosures.”).
97
Roberto Concepción, Jr., Need Not Apply: The Racial Disparate Impact of Pre-Employment
Criminal Background Checks, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 231, 233 (2012); Kimani Paul-Emile,
Reconsidering Criminal Background Checks: Race, Gender, and Redemption, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 395, 395–96 (2016).
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TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2200 (2021); Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct.
1540, 1544 (2016).
99
TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2201–02.
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failure “to provide a [consumer’s] . . . complete credit file, including a
summary of rights,” on request.100 The named plaintiff, Sergio Ramirez,
alleged that the erroneous alert on his credit report caused him to be unable to
purchase a car and to cancel a scheduled international vacation; TransUnion
contended that Ramirez’s experience was sufficiently atypical of the class to
invalidate the class for the purpose of statutory and punitive damages.101 The
petition for certiorari sought a decision as to “[w]hether either Article III or
Rule 23 permits a damages class action where the vast majority of the class
suffered no actual injury, let alone an injury anything like what the class
representative suffered.”102 In addressing this issue, the Court returned to the
question of what constitutes an “actual injury” and ultimately landed on a
stricter interpretation than that articulated in Spokeo.103
A number of amicus briefs filed in support of TransUnion’s position
raised the prospect of a deluge of litigation if the Supreme Court had
affirmed the decision of the Ninth Circuit, which held that the informational
injuries experienced by all of the affected class members were sufficient to
confer standing without an additional concrete injury akin to that suffered
by Mr. Ramirez.104 For example, an amicus brief filed by eBay, Facebook,
Google, and several other groups claimed that “[i]n similar cases, class
action plaintiffs have exploited lower courts’ lax enforcement of Article II’s
and Rule 23’s requirements and used the threat of exorbitant statutory and
punitive damages to extract in terrorem settlements” and urged the Supreme
Court to reverse the Ninth Circuit’s decision, which, they contended, “allows
100
Id. at 2207. The information the plaintiffs received from TransUnion consisted of two separate
mailings: one containing the credit report without a mention of the OFAC alert, and the other consisting
of a “courtesy” letter informing the affected individuals of a potential match to someone in the OFAC
database without a summary of rights or an indication that the OFAC information was present on the
individuals’ credit reports. Id. at 2216 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
101
TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2201–02; Ramirez v. TransUnion LLC, 951 F.3d 1008, 1033 (9th Cir.
2020).
102
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, TransUnion LLC, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (No. 20-297).
103
Id. at i, 18–19, 22–23.
104
See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae eBay, Inc. et al. Supporting Petitioner, TransUnion LLC, 141
S. Ct. 2190 (No. 20-297) (contending that “in similar cases, class action plaintiffs have exploited lower
courts’ lax enforcement of Article III’s and Rule 23’s requirements and used the threat of exorbitant
statutory and punitive damages to extract in terrorem settlements”); Brief of the Nat’l Consumer
Reporting Ass’n, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, TransUnion LLC, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (No.
20-297) (arguing that “[t]he Ninth Circuit’s decision below poses a major threat to the consumer
reporting industry” and “opens the flood gates for a tidal wave of similarly unharmed plaintiffs seeking
their fortune”); Brief of Pro. Background Screening Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
TransUnion LLC, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (No. 20-297) (claiming “potentially widespread and detrimental
consequences” of upholding the Ninth Circuit’s decision); Brief of the Chamber of Com. of the U.S. of
Am. & Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, TransUnion LLC, 141 S. Ct.
2190 (No. 20-297) (arguing that if the Ninth Circuit’s decision had been upheld, “other class-action
plaintiffs’ lawyers [would] be encouraged to follow its roadmap to transform what should be an
individualized dispute between a uniquely sympathetic plaintiff and a defendant into a multimillion dollar
class action”).
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plaintiffs to bring expansive class action lawsuits in federal court based on
nothing more than an allegation of a bare statutory violation without any
requirement of a material risk of actual harm.”105
However, the Ninth Circuit did not hold that the unnamed class members
were exempt from the requirement to show an injury sufficient to confer
standing; the court held that all the class members had standing because
“TransUnion inaccurately identified and labeled all class members as
potential terrorists, drug traffickers, and other threats to national security; it
did not inaccurately report a zip code or a minor discrepancy.”106 In addition,
TransUnion “made all class members’ reports available to potential creditors
or employers at a moment’s notice, even without the consumers’ knowledge
in some instances,”107 creating a risk of material harm to their reputation and
ability to obtain employment, credit, and any number of other goals that may
entail a credit or background check. “It is difficult to conceive of information
on a credit report that is more damaging to a consumer than a statement that
the consumer is potentially prohibited from transacting business in the
United States because the consumer is a criminal or a threat to national
security,” the court stressed.108 Indeed, this would seem to be the exact type
of harm the FCRA aims to prevent—and sufficiently actual or imminent to
support standing.
But the Supreme Court disagreed, ultimately holding that only the class
members who actually had their information disclosed experienced a
concrete injury sufficient to confer standing with respect to the FCRA’s
reasonable accuracy requirements, and only Sergio Ramirez himself had
standing to sue for formatting errors in the mailings he received from
TransUnion.109 Writing for the majority in a 5-4 decision, Justice Kavanaugh
reasoned that a risk of disclosure that did not materialize in the time frame
in question, even for something as serious as an erroneous OFAC alert, was
not itself a concrete harm sufficient to support Article III standing.110 With
respect to the formatting errors, the Court concluded that because “the
plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the format of TransUnion’s mailings
caused them a harm with a close relationship to a harm traditionally
recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts,”111 the
deficiencies fell into the Spokeo category of “bare procedural violation[s],
divorced from any concrete harm.”112
It remains to be seen how this development will affect future cases with
fact patterns similar to those in Syed and Gilberg. Although the majority
105
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opinion in TransUnion casts its logic as a straightforward application of
Spokeo, Justice Thomas, writing for the dissent, contends that in fact the
Court’s decision has radically narrowed plaintiffs’ ability to assert their legal
rights in federal court. “Never before has this Court declared that legal injury
is inherently insufficient to support standing,” he observes, and “never
before has this Court declared that legislatures are constitutionally precluded
from creating legal rights enforceable in federal court if those rights deviate
too far from their common-law roots.”113 Moreover, Thomas notes,
“TransUnion’s misconduct . . . is exactly the sort of thing that has long
merited legal redress.”114 With respect to the formatting errors, he remarks,
“[I]f this sort of confusing and frustrating communication is insufficient to
establish a real injury, one wonders what could rise to that level.”115
V.ADVERSE ACTION PROCEDURES
In the employment context, the primary shortcomings of the FCRA are
twofold: at the outset, a form of consent that is illusory at best because of the
power imbalance involved, and later in the process, adverse action notification
procedures that are woefully inadequate to protect an applicant’s interest in
prospective employment. As to the first issue, consent that stretches the
definition of “informed” is nothing unusual in today’s economy, with the
proliferation of impenetrable terms of service and contracts of adhesion
associated with everything from credit cards to social media platforms. While
undoubtedly a problem in need of a remedy, the FCRA’s shortcomings in this
respect are arguably less problematic than, for example, the routine collection
and dissemination of personal data that enables targeted advertising. All things
being equal, many job applicants might prefer to opt out of a pre-employment
background check if given a choice, but at least the relinquishment of certain
privacy rights in this context is tied to a concrete benefit—the possibility of
employment—and limited to specific permitted uses.
But if an employer decides that the information it has obtained through
a background check disqualifies an applicant from a particular role, the text
of the FCRA imposes no requirements that the employer consider an
applicant’s response, even if the information in the background check is
erroneous. The employer is required to provide a copy of the report and a
pre-adverse action letter containing a description of the applicant’s rights
under the FCRA,116 but the applicant does not have a statutory right to

113
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discuss the basis for the employer’s decision, provide context for the findings,
or point out inaccuracies directly to the employer. While the pre-adverse
action requirement may “slow[] down the process and ‘afford[] employees
time to “discuss reports with employers or otherwise respond before adverse
action is taken,”’”117 there is no mandate in the statute that this discussion
occur; the statute seems to assume that the temporal delay suffices to secure
this opportunity. Courts have noted that “the chance to . . . present [one’s] side
of the story” is “the very reason why the FCRA obligates employers to
produce a copy of the report before taking adverse action,”118 but without a
specific provision requiring that employers in fact give employees this chance,
the pre-adverse action process may be treated as a mere procedural hurdle on
the way to moving on the next candidate.
Employees do have a right to dispute the accuracy of a background report
with the credit reporting agency,119 and the required explanation of rights must
contain information on how to go about doing so, but the FCRA lacks a
mechanism for this information to make its way back to an employer in a
timely manner. The CRA has thirty days to investigate a dispute120 and must
provide written notice of the results of the investigation to the consumer within
five days of its completion.121 If the disputed information is found to be
inaccurate, the affected individual may request that the reporting agency
notify “any person specifically designated by the consumer who has within
two years prior . . . received a consumer report for employment purposes.”122
This time frame seems unlikely to provide any meaningful chance of
preserving the applicant’s ability to remain in contention for an employment
offer. Indeed, one court implicitly admitted as much, finding a plaintiff’s
contention that an employer should be required to wait out the thirty-day
period for a CRA to complete its investigation before taking adverse action to
[I]n using a consumer report for employment purposes, before taking any adverse
action based in whole or in part on the report, the person intending to take such adverse
action shall provide to the consumer to whom the report relates—
(i) a copy of the report; and
(ii) a description in writing of the rights of the consumer under this subchapter, as
prescribed by the Bureau under section 1681g(c)(3) . . . .
Id. For certain transportation roles, the adverse action procedures are even more perfunctory, allowing
the employer to take adverse action before providing the required notices if the only interaction between
the applicant and the prospective employer regarding the employment application has been by “mail,
telephone, computer, or other similar means.” Id. § 1681b(b)(3)(B)–(C).
117
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be an unworkable standard that “would create untenable constraints on
employers.”123 Thus, while correcting an erroneous report with a credit
reporting agency is an important step for the affected individual—and may
help the individual’s chances of successfully passing a background check at
the next job he or she applies for—it does nothing to remedy the harm of being
disqualified from the original job opportunity. Job opportunities are not
interchangeable, nor are they necessarily abundant or easy to obtain.
If it is to serve its purpose in the employment context, the FCRA should
be amended to require a meaningful opportunity for an applicant or
employee to engage in an interactive dialogue with the employer about the
results of the report, its accuracy or inaccuracy, and the context surrounding
any findings the employer believes to provide a basis for adverse action.
Some courts have maintained that, although the FCRA itself is silent on the
issue of how long an employer is required to wait between sending a
pre-adverse action notice and taking the contemplated adverse action,
legislative history illustrates an intent to provide employees with an
opportunity to respond.124 However, although a 1994 bill, the Consumer
Reporting Reform Act of 1994, would have amended the pre-adverse action
provisions of the FCRA to explicitly require an employer to provide “a
reasonable period (not required to exceed five business days following
receipt of the report by the consumer) to respond to any information in the
report that is disputed by the consumer,” the bill was never enacted.125 Since
that uncompleted attempt, the FCRA has undergone several substantive
amendments, notably in 1996 and 2003.126 Yet none of these amendments
returned to the issue of a specific waiting period between sending a
pre-adverse action notice and making the final decision to take adverse
action or attempted to clarify whether an employer has an obligation to
consider any information an employee may provide in response to a
pre-adverse action notice. And even if the 1994 bill had become law, by its
language it only addressed “information in the report that is disputed by the
123

Johnson v. ADP Screening & Selection Servs., Inc., 768 F. Supp. 2d 979, 983 (D. Minn. 2011).
See, e.g., Reardon v. ClosetMaid Corp., No. 2:08-cv-01730, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169821, at
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consumer.” While an accuracy dispute is perhaps the most obvious
situation in which an applicant would have an interest in engaging in a
dialogue with the prospective employer prior to an adverse action, it is by
no means the only one. An applicant may wish to provide context for an
accurate finding or contend that the information at issue is irrelevant to the
job, for example.
A number of courts have found that the statute implies a waiting period
and a meaningful opportunity to respond by its requirement that the
pre-adverse action notice precede the final decision of adverse action. For
example, in Magallon v. Robert Half International, Inc., an Oregon district
court considering the FCRA’s pre-adverse action procedure noted that
“although the text of the statute does not specify any particular requirement,
permitting the employer to ‘deliver the notice and then take adverse action
within seconds’ would render the statute’s use of ‘before’ meaningless.”128
The court went on to explain that an employer must give an applicant “an
opportunity to change the employer’s mind” before taking adverse action.129
“This opportunity must be real,” the court emphasized; “ a pro forma period
between the preliminary and final decision does not satisfy the statute.”130
However, this interpretation is not universal. In Johnson v. ADP Screening
& Selection Services, Inc., a Minnesota district court, while recognizing that
“Congress’s use of the word ‘before’ shows that there must be some time
between notice and action,”131 concluded that “[n]othing in the FCRA
requires an employer to consider any correction that a reporting agency
might make.”132 A Florida district court agreed, noting:
It is not improper for an employer to fully intend to carry out
the adverse action absent a dispute by the consumer, or even
to intend to carry out the adverse action notwithstanding the
result of any dispute a consumer might initiate. . . . The FCRA
requires an employer to pause and allow a reasonable
opportunity for a consumer to dispute the contents of a
consumer report, but does not mandate that the employer act
decently with respect to the results of any such dispute.133
Employers, of course, are not obligated to hire any given candidate for
a job, and there may be situations in which other factors in the hiring process
effectively disqualify a candidate, but because the background check may
127
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have played a small role, the pre-adverse action process is nevertheless
required. But by failing to specify what an employer must actually do with
the information an applicant provides in response to a pre-adverse action
notice, the FCRA does little to prevent employers from adopting blanket
policies of disqualifying any applicant whose background check report is
anything other than spotless—regardless of whether the information it
contains is accurate or relevant to the job in question.
State and municipal approaches to criminal background checks may
provide a workable model for filling some of these gaps. For example, the
Illinois Human Rights Act, recently amended in March 2021, requires an
employer to engage in an “interactive assessment” before disqualifying an
applicant from an employment opportunity on the basis of a criminal
conviction.134 The employer must provide “notice of the disqualifying
conviction or convictions that are the basis for the preliminary decision and
the employer’s reasoning for the disqualification; . . . a copy of the conviction
history report, if any; and . . . an explanation of the employee’s right to respond
to the notice of the employer’s preliminary decision before that decision
becomes final.”135 The statute also requires the employer to give the applicant
at least five business days to respond before the employer may make a final
decision.136 In addition, before initiating the disqualification notice process,
the employer must evaluate the relationship between the employment the
applicant is seeking and the conviction at issue, considering:
[T]he length of time since the conviction; . . . the number of
convictions that appear on the conviction record; . . . the nature
and severity of the conviction and its relationship to the safety
and security of others; . . . the facts or circumstances surrounding
the conviction; . . . the age of the employee at the time of the
conviction; and . . . evidence of rehabilitation efforts.137
The employer may only take adverse action if, after considering those factors:
[T]here is a substantial relationship between one or more of
the previous criminal offenses and the employment sought or
held; or . . . the granting or continuation of the employment
would involve an unreasonable risk to property or to the safety
or welfare of specific individuals or the general public.138
In a similar vein, the New York City Fair Chance Act prohibits an
employer from denying employment based on the results of a criminal
134
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background check without first providing a written copy of the report and
analyzing specified “fair chance” factors surrounding the nature of the
criminal conduct and its relationship to the employment sought.139 The
factors in the New York City ordinance are similar to those in the Illinois
statute. They include the seriousness of the offense, the age of the individual
at the time of the offense, the bearing of the offense on the individual’s
fitness for the specific position, the employer’s interest in protecting
property and safety, and information regarding the individual’s
rehabilitation or good conduct in the time since the offense took place.140
The New York City law goes a step further than the Illinois law, not just
securing an opportunity for the employee to respond to a pre-adverse action
notification but requiring the employer to proactively request information on
the “fair chance factors” from the employee, analyze the factors and their
relationship to the job, provide the employee with a written copy of the
analysis, and give the employee an opportunity to respond.141 The employee
thus has not just one, but two opportunities to engage in dialogue with the
employer—upon receiving the initial inquiry about the fair chance factors
from the employer and after receiving a copy of the employer’s analysis of
the information the employee has provided.
Interestingly, until recently, Philadelphia’s Unlawful Credit Screening
Practices in Employment ordinance required an employer to provide “the
particular information upon which the employer relied” before deciding to
take adverse action on the basis of a background check and “give the
employee or applicant an opportunity to explain the circumstances
surrounding the information at issue before taking any such adverse
action.”142 However, a 2021 ordinance amended this requirement to strip out
its more employee-friendly language and align its pre-adverse action
procedures with those of the FCRA.143 In the committee hearings that
considered the bill, none of the testifying parties acknowledged that the
139
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amended language in fact provides fewer rights to employees than the
previous version.144 In fact, the Executive Director of the Philadelphia
Commission on Human Relations, testifying in support of the ordinance,
stated that “Bill 200614 clarifies and strengthens [the adverse action]
provision by specifically memorializing the language of the federal
[FCRA].”145 It is difficult to see how this could be the case, given that the
FCRA already applied to the background screenings that are the subject of
the ordinance and the preexisting language in the ordinance demanded a
more meaningful interactive process than the FCRA’s minimal
requirements. This situation provides just a single illustration of the need for
a uniform federal statute that secures a meaningful right for an applicant or
employee to engage in dialogue about the findings of a background check
before an employer makes a final decision to proceed with an adverse action.
By requiring an employer to engage in this interactive process and
provide not just a copy of the background check report, but the specific
information that underlies its decision and its reasoning, the approach used
by the Illinois and New York City laws forces employers to consider the
applicant and any history of criminal convictions on a case-by-case basis
rather than implementing a blanket disqualification policy. An employer that
concludes, after performing this individualized assessment, that a particular
applicant’s criminal history is truly a bar to an employment offer is free to
make that determination, but by requiring the employer to document the
basis for its decision, the statute greatly increases the likelihood that the
decision will be based on objective job-related factors rather than
assumptions or prejudices against individuals with a criminal history. And
while the Illinois statute specifically applies only to criminal convictions, its
requirements for a specified waiting period and an interactive assessment
could easily be adapted and incorporated into the FCRA to apply to any
information in a background report from a consumer reporting agency that
forms the basis of an employer’s intended adverse action. While it would
impose a somewhat higher administrative burden than the current scheme
does, this interactive assessment process is not without precedent in other
aspects of employment law. For example, both the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 require
an employer confronted with an applicant or employee who requests a
reasonable accommodation because of a disability or a religious belief to
consider the request and engage in an interactive process to determine

144
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whether the individual’s needs can be met without imposing an undue
burden on the employer.146
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of the shortcomings and ambiguity surrounding the FCRA’s
pre-adverse action procedures, I propose that 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3) be
amended to add the following additional requirements:
1. Require a seven-day waiting period following a pre-adverse action
notice to give the employee a chance to respond. If the employee responds
by disputing the accuracy of the findings in question, the employer must
allow a reasonable time for the employee to gather and submit information
supporting his or her position and consider the information the employee has
provided in good faith to determine whether the employee’s account is likely
to be more accurate than the information the employer has received from the
consumer reporting agency. If the employee confirms the accuracy of an
unfavorable finding, the employer must invite the employee to provide any
information about mitigating circumstances or other context the employee
deems relevant. A seven-day waiting period would strike a balance between
an employer’s interest in promptly filling a position and an employee’s
ability to gather information that may be pertinent to the employer’s ultimate
analysis regarding the accuracy and relevance of any unfavorable
information uncovered during a background check.
2. Amend the pre-adverse action notice requirement to require the
employer to inform the applicant or employee of the specific finding or
findings in the background check report that informed its decision to send
the pre-adverse action notice. A background check report may be lengthy,
and without specific details about what the employer finds potentially
problematic, an employee’s ability to effectively respond with context or
provide information that might encourage the employer to reconsider will be
limited. In addition, requiring the employer to document the basis for its
decision with specificity and communicate it to the applicant or employee
will increase the likelihood of reasoned decision-making and consistent
application of a company policy or procedure.
3. Require an employer to analyze the relationship between the
information based on which it is considering adverse action and the specific
position sought or held by the applicant or employee, including any
information the applicant or employee has provided in response to the
146
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pre-adverse action notice. The employer must document this analysis and
provide it to the applicant or employee before making a final adverse action
decision and give the employee a final opportunity to respond. By analyzing
the relationship between the potentially problematic findings and the
demands and duties of a particular position, the employer may conclude in
some cases that no such relationship exists, or that the relationship is too
tenuous to disqualify an otherwise qualified applicant. This process should
encourage employers to take a more nuanced approach to background check
information and disqualify applicants only when a strong business reason
exists—if not for concerns for fairness and equity, then out of self-interest
in avoiding legal liability for disqualifying applicants on flimsy reasoning
that may raise the specter of unlawful discrimination.
4. Prohibit employers from initiating the background check process on
an applicant before extending a conditional employment offer. This
provision would safeguard applicants’ privacy rights by ensuring that an
applicant who is required to submit to a background check has a strong
chance of securing the position. In addition, as a practical matter, this
provision would reduce the administrative burden of the interactive process
I have proposed by limiting it only to candidates the employer wishes to hire
rather than the larger pool of applicants.
CONCLUSION
The Fair Credit Reporting Act is not a statute within the traditional
bounds of employment law, but it has far-reaching implications for whom
employers choose to hire, and its impacts are not equitably distributed. In its
current state, its protections against needless privacy invasion of job
applicants are minimal at best, and its adverse action procedures do little to
ensure that individuals are not disqualified from employment opportunities
based on background check information without a sound business-related
reason. Courts have an important role to play in upholding the protections it
does contain and should approach allegations of FCRA violations with an
emphasis on the underlying purpose of the statute—informed consent and a
meaningful chance to make one’s case before an adverse action decision
becomes final. But judicial action is insufficient to transform the FCRA into
a robust source of safeguards for applicants’ and employees’ interests in
privacy and securing employment. To achieve that goal, the statute should
be amended as I propose above, informed by the state and local laws that
have already adopted this approach in order to increase transparency into the
background check process and ensure a consistent, fair process that
effectively balances the rights of applicants and employees against those of
employers.

